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FROM “CASES” TO “LITIGATION” TO “CONTRACT”: 
A COMMENT ON STABILITY IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 
DAVID MARCUS* 
INTRODUCTION 
If American civil litigation is a drama, then for three decades Judith Resnik 
has played the choragos.1  Her descriptions and deconstructions of civil 
procedure’s evolutionary currents have no parallel.  With article titles alone—
From “Cases” to “Litigation”2 is my favorite—Professor Resnik has set the 
terms of debate over civil procedure’s present and future.3  Her rich historical 
narratives bring to life epoch-making moments and epoch-making 
proceduralists far more vividly than deracinated procedural theory could.  This 
attention to context and personality has enabled Professor Resnik to ask what 
procedure ought to accomplish in light of what it has done in the past, what it 
needs to do in light of emergent challenges, what values it has served, and 
what values it favors or jeopardizes as it evolves. 
In one way or another, many of Professor Resnik’s influential articles 
address procedural legitimacy, or the potential of civil processes to function 
fairly, accurately, efficiently, and appropriately in a democratic system of 
government.4  A pattern emerges from articles like From “Cases” to 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arizona Rogers College of Law.  Many thanks to 
Barbara Atwood, Toni Massaro, and Nina Rabin for comments on prior drafts.  I am grateful to 
Joel Goldstein and members of the Saint Louis University Law Journal, particularly Sarah 
Pohlman, for including me in the 2011 Childress Lecture.  Most importantly, I owe a great debt of 
gratitude to Judith Resnik, for her help with this Comment, for suggesting me as a Childress 
participant, and for the years of mentorship and support she has given me. 
 1. The metaphor is not entirely apt.  Whereas a choragos, as the leader of a chorus in a 
Greek drama, comments on the action but did not participate in it, Professor Resnik has been 
active for decades in both litigation and procedural reform efforts.  See WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD 
COLLEGE DICTIONARY 260 (4th ed. 2002). 
 2. Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation”, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991) 
[hereinafter Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation”]. 
 3. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378–79 (1982) 
[hereinafter Resnik, Managerial Judges] (discussing the “new oversight role” of judges and the 
reasons for the rise of the managerial judge); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 593, 593–94 (2005) [hereinafter Resnik, Procedure as Contract] (“[D]ebate needs 
to center on what the law of ‘Contract Procedure’ should provide.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 3, at 598. 
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“Litigation” and others in its vein.5  Professor Resnik starts with a bygone era, 
during which a procedural model that served a set of values well thrived.6  She 
describes how new processes emerge that deviate from this historical baseline 
in response to social, cultural, political, and legal change.7  To the extent that 
values well-served by earlier processes suffer as procedure evolves, Professor 
Resnik asks whether the new forms and practices compensate for what is lost.8  
If not, the new processes risk a legitimacy deficit. 
In my homage to this part of Professor Resnik’s vast and influential 
oeuvre, I start with a premise based on this pattern: most members of the 
various communities that care about procedural legitimacy measure emergent 
procedures against an entrenched model that they vest with presumptive 
legitimacy.  If correct, this premise permits a descriptive account, which I 
provide in Part I, that can help identify legitimate procedures and make sense 
of why they are legitimate.  I argue that, in many instances, procedural 
legitimacy manifests itself as stability, an observable phenomenon.  This 
stability depends significantly on social perceptions of procedural efficacy.  
During the present procedural era, observers of and participants in civil 
processes believe that  procedures that govern the individual lawsuit—a 
remarkably stable procedural form—are effective, fair, and therefore legitimate 
per se.  To use Professor Resnik’s words, “the best efforts of the individual 
case system” provide many of us with a yardstick to evaluate legitimacy.9  A 
deviation from this norm requires a justification responding to some 
nonprocedural policy demand, or what I call a “regulatory need,” to enjoy 
legitimacy. 
In Part II, I use another influential part of Professor Resnik’s corpus as a 
springboard to discuss a particular deviation from the individual lawsuit 
baseline.  In Procedure as Contract and repeatedly since then, she has 
expressed her unease with the phenomenon by which procedural regularity 
gives way to idiosyncrasy as parties “bargain for” particularized dispute 
 
 5. Other such articles include Judith Resnik, Compared to What?: ALI Aggregation and the 
Shifting Contours of Due Process and of Lawyers’ Powers, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628 (2011) 
[hereinafter Resnik, Compared to What?] and Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory 
Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986) [hereinafter Resnik, Failing Faith]. 
 6. See, e.g., Resnik, Compared to What?, supra note 5, at 641 (beginning her examination 
of “legitimacy through publicity” and the importance of open court proceedings by looking at the 
1792 Delaware Constitution and mid-nineteenth-century constitutions).  I do not intend to suggest 
that Professor Resnik yearns for the past or treats it uncritically.  See Resnik, From “Cases” to 
“Litigation”, supra note 2, at 68 (describing “dashed hopes about what individual, case-by-case 
adjudication can provide”). 
 7. See Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 5, at 540–45. 
 8. See Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation”, supra note 2, at 66–68. 
 9. Id. at 68. 
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resolution processes.10 Professor Resnik has argued that contract’s 
encroachment into the procedural realm tends to remove civil litigation from 
public view and thereby diminish procedure’s potential to legitimate the 
exercise of power in a democracy.11  Discussing a recent evolution in the law 
of aggregate litigation, I deploy my descriptive account of procedural 
legitimacy to explain why I concur with her concerns.  If procedural legitimacy 
depends significantly on social perceptions, then the movement of civil 
processes into contractual shadows is troubling.  This phenomenon interferes 
with reasoned and informed perceptions of procedural efficacy and makes 
possible the prospect that bad procedure will nonetheless stabilize. 
I.  PROCEDURAL STABILITY AND LEGITIMACY 
Proceduralists are a funny lot.  On one hand, many of them harbor 
conservative (with a little “c”) tendencies.  The disappearance of the civil trial 
has caused no end of heartburn, and yet the question “[w]hy does it matter?” 
remains open.12  On the other hand, “[p]rocedures” have always had “great 
plasticity,” to use Professor Resnik’s words.13  Constant reform is not only 
embraced but arguably built into the American procedural edifice.14  A 
pragmatic philosophical bent bridges these competing impulses.15  As one of 
pragmatism’s variants treats them, traditional means of solving problems have 
presumptive legitimacy.  They claim no abstract normative supremacy, but 
their wide and long-standing acceptance suggests that they work well.  
Wisdom may be inherited but it is not sacrosanct, so innovations are welcome.  
 
 10. Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 3, at 595; see also Judith Resnik, Fairness in 
Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 78, 132 (2011) [hereinafter Resnik, Fairness in Numbers]; Judith Resnik, Bring 
Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and Public Sphere(s), 5 LAW & ETHICS HUM. 
RTS. 1, 46–47 (2011) [hereinafter Resnik, Bring Back Bentham].  I put “bargain for” in quotations 
because most of these contracts are adhesive.  See Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra, at 128–29 
(commenting on this phenomenon). 
 11. Resnik, Bring Back Bentham, supra note 10, at 52–53. 
 12. Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a 
Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 401 (2011). 
 13. Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 809 
(2008). 
 14. See Thurman Arnold, The Rôle of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process, 
45 HARV. L. REV. 617, 643 (1932) (describing lawyers’ attitudes toward procedure and why they 
make constant reform possible). 
 15. On the pragmatic ethos of American civil procedure, see, for example, Robert G. Bone, 
Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 212 
(1992) [hereinafter Bone, Rethinking]. 
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Yet changes require some justification, in terms of functional efficacy, for why 
the new means succeed better than the old.16 
Most proceduralists are probably pragmatists—interested in and amenable 
to change, but mildly skeptical of it nonetheless.  If this assessment is right, it 
motivates an account that can explain how to identify legitimate procedures 
and, at least partially, why they are legitimate.  This account includes four 
claims: 
(1) Procedural legitimacy may be difficult to establish as a matter of 
normative theory, but legitimate forms and processes are observable as 
social facts.  Provided that it does not conflict with a society’s 
fundamental political morality, a stable procedure is most likely 
legitimate for that society at a particular moment in time. 
(2) Two determinants contribute to the stability, and thus overall 
legitimacy, of a procedure: formal legitimacy and social legitimacy.  
The former depends on whether some authoritative law permits the 
form or practice.  The latter turns on whether members of the relevant 
communities perceive the procedure to be fair, accurate, efficient, and 
appropriate in their political system. 
(3) At the present, a procedure enjoys a deep reservoir of social legitimacy 
if it resembles what happens in the ideal-type of the individual lawsuit.  
If the procedure deviates from this baseline, it will be unstable unless it 
effectively addresses some compelling regulatory need. 
(4) Social legitimacy matters more than formal legitimacy to the stability 
and thus overall legitimacy of a procedure over time. 
This account is pragmatic in two ways.  First, it lashes procedural legitimacy to 
the mast of the individual lawsuit, a widely accepted and inherited adjudicatory 
form.  Deviations from this baseline are also potentially legitimate but require 
a justification that makes sense as a functional matter.  Second, formal rules 
matter less to legitimacy than perceptions of efficacy. 
I use illustrations from class action history and commentary to elaborate on 
each claim.  Before I do, two qualifications are in order.  The first is obvious.  
Many of my claims need empirical support, and I therefore present them here 
as hypotheses.  Second, my aim is modest.  I hope to provide an instrument of 
sorts to use to tell which processes are legitimate for particular communities at 
particular moments in time.  The stability of a particular procedure means 
nothing by itself to its normative desirability.  The latter requires a theory 
about adjudication and the role it plays in a particular political order.  For a 
similar reason, I acknowledge a limitation to my descriptive contribution.  I do 
not explain why the individual lawsuit baseline is legitimate, something that 
 
 16. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 
1331, 1344–46 (1988). 
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would require an inquiry into adjudication’s ends and the individual lawsuit’s 
success as a means to them.  Rather, I assert that a stable procedure is most 
likely legitimate, for whatever reason, and identify the determinants that make 
this so. 
A. Observing Procedural Legitimacy 
People have different expectations for how civil litigation should proceed, 
and thus they employ different metrics for judging procedural legitimacy.  If a 
procedure enjoys wide and generally uncontroversial acceptance among 
members of the relevant communities, however, it likely measures up by many 
of these metrics.  Its stability over time operates as an observable indicator that 
the procedure is legitimate for that particular society at that particular moment.  
Time matters for several reasons.  Informed judgments about procedural 
efficacy can take a while to form, as lawyers, judges, and others observe the 
results of particular practices.  Also, a feedback loop exists.  As a new 
procedure gets established, it in turn influences expectations about how civil 
litigation should proceed. 
Four determinants contribute to or detract from a procedure’s stability.  
Two of them are components of its overall legitimacy.  First, the procedure 
enjoys a strong endowment of “formal legitimacy” if some authoritative legal 
source unequivocally authorizes it.  A federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction 
over a dispute between citizens of different states with more than $75,000 in 
controversy is formally legitimate because the practice has an unassailable 
legal foundation.17  When a court compels parties to submit to nonbinding 
mediation, and no statute or procedural rule expressly permits the court’s 
order, the practice has a weaker claim to formal legitimacy.18  An unlawful 
practice has no formal legitimacy.  Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure does not allow a court to grant a motion for sanctions if the 
nonmoving party has not had twenty-one days within which to withdraw the 
offensive paper.19  A sanctions order issued before this safe harbor closes has 
no formal legitimacy.20  Formal legitimacy has a straightforward relationship 
 
 17. The case undoubtedly satisfies the statutory requirements for diversity jurisdiction, and 
the statute is manifestly constitutional.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). 
 18. Compare In re Atl. Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 142–45 (1st Cir. 2002) (refusing to find 
authorization for this sort of order in the nonspecific terms of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, but finding authorization for it in the “inherent powers” of the court), with 
Strandell v. Jackson Cnty., 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 1987) (refusing to allow a district court to 
order the parties to submit to a summary jury trial in the absence of a statute or rule expressly 
giving the court the power to issue such a rule). 
 19. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2). 
 20. See id.; see also Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp., 48 F.3d 1320, 1327–29 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(finding a district court could not grant a motion for sanctions when the safe-harbor period had 
not yet run). 
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with overall legitimacy.  An unlawful order will gain little traction as an 
acceptable practice and thus will enjoy no stability. 
“Social legitimacy,” stability’s second determinant, refers to perceptions.  
A procedure enjoys a significant endowment of social legitimacy if most 
members of the relevant communities perceive it to be fair, accurate, efficient, 
and consistent with fundamental political and social commitments.  I develop 
the idea of social legitimacy further in the next section. 
No impermeable boundary separates formal from social legitimacy.  A 
practice’s formal legitimacy can strengthen social perceptions of legitimacy, as 
lawfulness strengthens arguments for the practice.21  Likewise, a practice’s 
social legitimacy can influence its formal legitimacy.  Marginally lawful 
practices that address a widely recognized need can spur codifiers to act,22 and 
robust social legitimacy can encourage continued use of a legally questionable 
practice.23 
Exogenous shocks and political sclerosis, the third and fourth 
determinants, can affect a procedure’s stability but not in ways that bear on its 
legitimacy.  The former are changes in law or society that happen for reasons 
mostly unrelated to procedural efficacy, but that have a destabilizing effect for 
the procedure.  The collapse in the number of antitrust class actions in the early 
1980s, for example, had less to do with tepid enthusiasm for Rule 23 in this 
substantive area and more to do with the Reagan Administration’s deregulatory 
agenda.24  Also, a deeply problematic procedure can remain in place, not 
 
 21. See, e.g., RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES 222–23 (William W. Dawson 
ed., 1938) (statement of Charles Clark) (invoking a Massachusetts decision on pleading to 
respond to critics of Rule 8). 
 22. Rule 23 was amended to permit appellate review of class certification decisions after 
lower federal courts began to engage in this sort of interlocutory review by way of mandamus.  
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (amended 1998); Linda S. Mullenix, Some Joy in Whoville: Rule 23(f), A 
Good Rulemaking, 69 TENN. L. REV. 97, 101, 102 (2001); e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 
51 F.3d 1293, 1294 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 23. Summary judgment is a “pillar of our system,” as one critic acknowledges, 
notwithstanding thoughtful objections to its lawfulness.  John Bronsteen, Against Summary 
Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 523 (2007); see also Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary 
Judgment is Still Unconstitutional: A Reply to Professors Brunet and Nelson, 93 IOWA L. REV. 
1667, 1669–72, 1678 (2008) (summarizing influential argument regarding unconstitutionality of 
summary judgment as well as attempts to rebut it).  Courts have rejected out-of-hand challenges 
to summary judgment’s constitutionality.  E.g., McDaniel v. Kindred Hosp., Inc., 311 F. App’x 
758, 758 (6th Cir. 2009); Diekan v. Blackwelder, No. 10–ADMS–10039, 2011 WL 1167367, at 
*1 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Mar. 23, 2011). 
 24. Many antitrust class actions come on the heels of government action.  Thus, when the 
Reagan Administration scaled back antitrust enforcement, fewer private antitrust class actions 
were filed.  Douglas Martin, The Rise and Fall of the Class-Action Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 
1988, at B7; see also John E. McClatchey, Introduction: Private Enforcement in the New 
Antitrust Era, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 271, 272–74 (1989).  On the Reagan Administration’s antitrust 
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because it is legitimate, but because of political sclerosis.  Congress’s repeated 
failures to replace tort with some administrative compensation scheme for 
asbestos litigation, for example, speak more to lobbying dynamics than to 
widespread satisfaction with traditional litigation.25  These determinants are 
idiosyncratic, and for that reason I do not build them into my account of 
procedural legitimacy more generally. 
B. Social Legitimacy and the Individual Lawsuit Baseline 
Social legitimacy requires elaboration, especially since my definition—a 
procedure enjoys social legitimacy if members of the relevant communities 
believe in its efficacy—borders on the tautological.  Proceduralists may use 
different sets of values to measure procedural legitimacy, which in turn depend 
on their political and social commitments.  For the present procedural era, I 
hypothesize that these varied metrics, whatever they value and however they 
are deployed, produce roughly the same result.  For decades, proceduralists 
have generally believed that a procedure modeled on what happens in the 
individual lawsuit, conceived of as an ideal-type, is legitimate.26  The ideal-
type of this lawsuit has familiar features: 
 Parties of roughly equal strength with legal counsel initiate and defend 
the litigation; 
 the case proceeds before a detached, neutral judge in a courtroom open 
to the public; 
 attorneys solicit their clients’ input for key litigation decisions; 
 each party has meaningful notice of what happens in the case, a 
meaningful opportunity to gather evidence to support claims and 
defenses, and a meaningful opportunity to be heard; and 
 
enforcement, see, for example, Robert Pitofsky, Does Antitrust Have a Future?, 76 GEO. L.J. 
321, 321–24 (1987).  On antitrust class actions’ tendency to piggyback on government efforts, see 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as 
Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 222 & n.16 (1983). 
 25. See Deborah R. Hensler, Asbestos Litigation in the United States: Triumph and Failure 
of the Civil Justice System, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 255, 273–78 (2006). 
 26. See JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, MAX WEBER: POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT OF TRAGEDY 120–
23 (1996).  Max Weber’s concept of the ideal type is complicated, but an introductory definition 
suffices for this Comment.  Ideal types are “heuristic categories that serve the purpose of posing 
questions and clarifying concepts.  Ideal types are meant to be exaggerated simplifications of the 
complexity of historical data so that behavior may be analyzed in view of its approximations or 
deviations from the model or ‘ideal,’ that is, its complete attributes.”  Id. at 123. 
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 the impact of the lawsuit is constrained in time and scope, in that the 
primary purpose is remediation and dispute resolution, and that any 
wider impact is incidental.27 
Practices consistent with this baseline are per se socially legitimate.  If a 
practice differs from what happens in the individual lawsuit, it can still enjoy 
social legitimacy, but only if a compelling regulatory need justifies its 
deviation.28 
Much contemporary civil litigation deviates from this stylized baseline;29 
the individual lawsuit may not have always been the Anglo-American norm;30 
other adjudicatory forms have enjoyed social legitimacy;31 and the individual 
lawsuit form may deserve normative scrutiny.  What functions as the 
procedural baseline, however, does not necessarily have to reflect the empirical 
average.  As Professor Resnik has written, “the images that shape our thoughts 
are often not based upon statistical data . . . [but] ‘vivid’ information.”32  I 
acknowledge that my unproven hypothesis warrants skepticism, but I wager 
that the individual lawsuit form is probably more firmly entrenched today in 
perceptions about efficacious procedure than at any time in the past three 
decades.33  For decades, commentators have juxtaposed the individual lawsuit 
 
 27. These are roughly the traits that Abram Chayes famously identified in the “traditional 
model” of litigation.  Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1281, 1282–83 (1976); see also Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1979). 
 28. Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Playing the Baseline: Civil Rights, Environmental Law, and 
Statutory Interpretation, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 676, 678 n.12 (1991) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990)) (“A 
baseline . . . is a state of affairs that requires no justification, and that establishes a norm, so that 
any deviations from the baseline require special justification.”). 
 29. For example, for the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2010, twenty-five 
percent of all civil actions in the federal courts included pro se litigants, a departure from the 
individual lawsuit ideal type in which the parties have representation.  ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE 
OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2010 ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 78 tbl. S-23 (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Sta 
tistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf. 
 30. See Chayes, supra note 27, at 1283–84, 1283 n.11; cf. Bone, Rethinking, supra note 15, 
at 204 (challenging the “conventional understanding” that affording an individual his or her day-
in-court has long been a sacrosanct requirement for a fair procedure). 
 31. See Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 10, at 135 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011)) (describing acceptance of class action as “an exception 
to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties 
only”).  See generally Fiss, supra note 27 (defending structural-reform litigation). 
 32. Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 5, at 511. 
 33. Compare Marsha S. Berzon, Rights and Remedies, 64 LA. L. REV. 519, 525 (2004) 
(presenting a widely held view that structural injunction litigation has declined since the 1970s), 
with Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison 
Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 553–54, 568–69 (2006) (using data on prison reform 
injunctions to refute this “conventional wisdom”). 
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with other “models” of adjudication.34  Professor Resnik, for example, named 
an emergent procedural era in 1982 with her “managerial judging” model.35  
Each of these alternatives has weathered doctrinal or political challenges, 
sometimes couched in terms of how sharply they deviate from the individual 
lawsuit norm.36  In contrast, the individual lawsuit continues to flourish, at 
times resisting replacement more muscularly than it has in previous decades.37 
C. Regulatory Need and Social Legitimacy 
Procedures that depart from the individual lawsuit baseline can enjoy 
widespread acceptance.  But, whereas individual lawsuit processes are socially 
legitimate per se, these deviations stabilize only if they respond effectively to a 
regulatory need that requires them.  Three class action examples illustrate this 
hypothesis. 
1. Derivations and Regulatory Need: The Negative-Value Class Action 
In July 1966, revisions to Rule 23 that generated modern class action 
practice went into effect.38  The generic negative-value class action prosecuted 
under this revised rule deviates significantly from the individual lawsuit 
model.39  Lawyers, not clients, initiate and control the litigation;40 class 
members have either compromised or nonexistent rights to individual days-in-
court;41 the litigation has a widespread impact not incidentally but by design;42 
and so on.  Serious doubts plagued the class action’s formal legitimacy until 
 
 34. See Chris H. Miller, The Adaptive American Judiciary: From Classical Adjudication to 
Class Action Litigation, 72 ALB. L. REV. 117, 120–30 (2009) (cataloguing these proposed 
models). 
 35. See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 3, at 380. 
 36. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE 
L.J. 27, 34 (2003). 
 37. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011) (beginning an opinion 
restricting a use of Rule 23 that had been permitted since the 1970s with an endorsement of the 
individual day-in-court ideal); Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93 (2008) (rejecting the 
notion of “virtual representation” that had been accepted by a number of circuits for years); Ortiz 
v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) (invoking the individual day-in-court ideal to 
contest mandatory class actions that had been experimented with since the early 1980s). 
 38. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 383 U.S. 
1029, 1031 (1966). 
 39. Negative-value class actions are ones where, absent joinder, the costs of litigating a 
claim would exceed its value. 
 40. Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the 
Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 309, 383 (1996); 
Bone, Rethinking, supra note 15, at 198. 
 41. Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring 
Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 27–28 (2002). 
 42. Jon Romberg, Half a Loaf is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certification of 
Particular Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249, 258 (2002). 
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recently.43  But, by the late 1970s, threats to the stability of the negative-value 
class action largely disappeared,44 and the adjudicatory form remained in a 
state of “dynamic . . . equilibrium” until 2011.45 
Uncertain lawfulness notwithstanding, the negative-value class action 
stabilized in the 1970s because it served a regulatory need.  The circumstances 
prevailing at its gestation explain why this novel adjudicatory form took root 
when it did.  Efforts to create a procedural mechanism that could generate 
binding judgments without plaintiff consent, Rule 23’s pioneering innovation, 
failed before the 1960s.46  By the decade’s end, however, the need for this 
mechanism grew acute.  The negative-value class action responds to a failure 
in the market for rights vindication.47  Suits for injuries with insufficient value 
 
 43. Immediately after its promulgation and for decades thereafter, critics attacked the new 
Rule 23 on grounds that it affected substantive rights in violation of the Rules Enabling Act 
(“REA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).  See, e.g., Edward J. Ross, Rule 23(b) Class Actions—A 
Matter of “Practice and Procedure” or “Substantive Right”?, 27 EMORY L.J. 247, 251 & n.15 
(1978); William Simon, Class Actions—Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 
386 (1973); see also Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed 
Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 19 (2010) (alluding to such criticisms).  
The Supreme Court only addressed this issue in 2010.  See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 
P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443–44 (2010) (upholding Rule 23 under the REA). 
 44. See Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and 
the “Class Action Problem”, 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 668 (1979) (observing in 1979 that “class 
action practice under the existing rule appears to be stabilizing”). 
 45. This description, from a prominent and thoughtful practitioner, is apt.  Statement of 
Elizabeth Cabraser on Proposed Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, in 4 WORKING PAPERS OF 
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, at 
600, 601 (1997). 
 46. In 1956, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a proposed amendment that would have 
enabled Rule 23 to generate preclusive judgments.  See Order Discharging the Advisory 
Committee, 352 U.S. 803 (1956); see also ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR 
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 26–27 (1955), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/us 
courts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV10-1955.pdf (describing the proposed amendment that 
the Supreme Court rejected); Charles Clark, Reporter, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil 
Proc., Remarks at the Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
121 (May 18, 1953) (clarifying the intended preclusive effect of proposed amendment).  Some 
commentators before 1966 advocated a class action rule that would generate preclusive 
judgments for some absent class members without their consent.  E.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., 
SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 282–83 (1950); Arthur John Keefe, Stanley M. Levy & Richard P. 
Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327, 342–43 (1948).  When a Texas court 
treated a class action judgment in this manner, its decision attracted near-universal criticism.  See 
Russell P. Duncan, Note, Due Process Requirements of a State Class Action, 55 YALE L.J. 831, 
832 (1946) (discussing Richardson v. Kelly, 191 S.W.2d 857 (1945) to illustrate the “injustice 
[that] may result” from such an interpretation); Harold Hoffman, Comment, Denial of Due 
Process Through Use of the Class Action, 25 TEX. L. REV. 64, 64, 68 (1947). 
 47. E.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van 
Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)) (“The policy at the very core of the class 
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to attract fee-seeking plaintiffs’ lawyers go unfiled.  Government intervention, 
the standard response to a market failure, was an unattractive alternative by the 
late 1960s. The problems of agency ineptitude and capture, which Ralph Nader 
and others began to spotlight mid-decade, eroded confidence in bureaucratic 
efficacy.48  Had agencies been inclined to regulate effectively, they often 
lacked the resources to do so.49  Political polarization within Congress and 
between Congress and the President made bureaucratic improvement 
difficult.50  The class action solved this problem,51 one all the more pressing as 
the universe of substantive rights expanded in the 1960s and 1970s.52  Rights 
vindication would depend on private initiative, not government action.  
Aggregation, which Rule 23 made easy by minimizing the transaction costs of 
joinder, provided the financial incentive.  Lawyers could spread costs across a 
lot of claims and collect fees from all of them. 
After some tumult in its first decade, the negative-value class action did 
not face opposition from lawyers, judges, or legislators that gained serious 
traction.53  Two reasons explain this stability.  First, there is no reason to think 
 
action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive 
for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1039, 1061–62 (1997); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical 
Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1296 (1986); Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After 
the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith in Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 689, 
692–93 (2000). 
 49. E.g., S. REP. NO. 91-1124, at 4 (1970) (discussing the incapacity of the Federal Trade 
Commission effectively to enforce consumer protection legislation); Robert Belton, A 
Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 31 VAND. L. REV. 905, 920–23 (1978) (describing how the EEOC was overwhelmed by the 
number of complaints by 1971). 
 50. SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE 
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 4–5 (2010). 
 51. For a statement to this effect from the time, see, for example, Arthur H. Travers, Jr. & 
Jonathan M. Landers, The Consumer Class Action, 18 U. KAN. L. REV. 811, 812–14 (1970). 
 52. E.g., FARHANG, supra note 50, at 66–67 (demonstrating the explosion in statutory 
entitlements starting in the mid-1960s); Robert L. Rabin, The Monsanto Lectures: Tort Law in 
Transition: Tracing the Patterns of Sociolegal Change, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988) 
(discussing the emergence of modern product liability litigation in the early 1960s). 
 53. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 was perhaps the most significant federal 
legislative effort to curb class litigation to pass since the revision of Rule 23 in 1966.  The statute 
itself recognizes that “[c]lass action lawsuits are an important and valuable part of the legal 
system when they permit the fair and efficient resolution of legitimate claims of numerous 
parties.”  Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, §2(a)(1), 119 Stat. 4, 4.  In 
comparison, in the 1970s efforts to destroy class action practice entirely received serious 
consideration.  E.g., AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RULE 23 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 31–32 (1972) 
(recommending that class members have to opt in to class actions); ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL 
RULES, THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE 
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that the regulatory need the class action addressed in the late 1960s weakened.  
Second, social legitimacy is sticky.  Once a procedure becomes entrenched, its 
normalcy influences expectations among members of relevant communities 
about how civil litigation should proceed. 
2. Deviations and Regulatory Need: The Rise and Fall of the Mass Tort 
Class Action 
The three periods in the history of the mass tort class action more fluidly 
illustrate how social legitimacy and regulatory need interact to influence a 
procedure’s stability when it deviates from the individual lawsuit baseline.  
From the mid-1960s until the early 1980s, courts rarely certified proposed 
classes of personal injury claimants.54  The market for individual legal 
representation never failed, so no policy justification existed forcibly to 
aggregate plaintiffs who could attract individual representation and litigate on 
their own. 
Ironically, high claim value, the very reason for this market’s adequacy, 
created a different regulatory need for aggregate processing by the mid-1980s.  
To put it crudely, plaintiffs filed too many individual actions, not too few.  An 
“avalanche” of asbestos litigation,55 seconded by huge quantities of DES, 
Dalkon Shield, breast implant, and other similar cases,56 threatened to 
overwhelm federal dockets and deny individual plaintiffs actual access to 
courts.57  With no good options,58 some defendants, drowning under an 
 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 3 (1976), microformed on CI-6504-31 (proposing that the Advisory 
Committee seriously consider the ACTL’s recommendations). 
 54. The first instance in which a district court certified a class in a mass tort case was Payton 
v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 385–87 (D. Mass. 1979), vacated, 100 F.R.D. 336 (D. Mass. 
1983).  See also In Camera, 5 CLASS ACTION REP. 469, 469 (1978) (observing that this case 
represented the first instance of a certified mass tort class).  The judge subsequently de-certified 
the class.  Payton v. Abbott Labs, 100 F.R.D. 336, 340 (D. Mass. 1983).  The first certified mass 
tort class to withstand subsequent review came in the Agent Orange litigation in 1983.  See In re 
“Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 720 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), mandamus denied, In 
re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1984).  The original district judge 
indicated that he would certify an Agent Orange class in 1980, but he never entered a class 
certification order.  Id. at 720.  Some mass accident cases were certified before 1979.  See, e.g., 
Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 47 (E.D. Ky. 1977); Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 
F.R.D. 558, 560, 562 (S.D. Fla. 1973); In re Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624, 630 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Am. 
Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 155, 156 (N.D. Ill. 1969).  But see 
Marchesi v. E. Airlines, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 500, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (describing the view that mass 
accident cases cannot be certified as “well settled”). 
 55. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 56. Cf. Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL 
L. REV. 941, 945–47 (1995) (summarizing the emergence of the mass tort phenomenon post-
1969). 
 57. Judge Walter Skinner stressed this point when he issued the first decision certifying a 
mass tort class in the federal system.  Payton, 83 F.R.D. at 390 (“The courts are faced with the 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] FROM “CASES” TO “LITIGATION” TO “CONTRACT” 1243 
unceasing torrent of individual actions, joined with plaintiffs to seek class 
certification and resolve all their liability at once.59  Sensing an existential 
threat, federal appellate courts began to let class certification orders stand.60  
As they did, they invoked this regulatory need to explain why they now 
allowed deviations from the individual lawsuit baseline for tort claims.61 
The pendulum began to swing back in the mid-1990s, and presently courts 
rarely deploy Rule 23 to manage mass torts.62  The regulatory need has 
subsided.  Asbestos filings have continued to mushroom,63 but other mass torts 
that loomed on the horizon in the mid-1990s never really materialized.64  Also, 
class certification did not prove to be the sine qua non for handling mass torts 
as it might have seemed in the desperate days of the 1980s.  At present, 
lawyers and judges handle the mass torts that have developed in ways that do 
not deviate as far from the individual lawsuit baseline, at least formally, as the 
class action.65 
 
choice of adapting traditional methods to the recurrent phenomenon of widespread drug litigation 
or leaving large numbers of people without a practical means of redress.”). 
 58. The most-often proposed alternative, a legislatively created compensation scheme to 
replace the tort system, never materialized.  See Richard Nagareda, Public and Private Law 
Perspectives: Transcript of Professor Richard Nagareda, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 659, 660 (2008). 
 59. Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A 
Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1497–98 (2008). 
 60. See In re Cordis Corp. Pacemaker Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 850, C-3-86-543, 1992 
WL 754061, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 23, 1992) (citing Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 
1188, 1196–97 (6th Cir. 1988)) (“[C]ourts no longer consider such [mass tort] cases to be per se 
unsuitable for certification.”). 
 61. E.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 709, 725 (4th Cir. 1989) (stressing the “recent 
. . . proliferation in the development and distribution of new products[,] . . . the complaints of 
injuries from the use of these products[,] . . . [and] an accelerating avalanche of mass products 
liability suits” as creating “probably the most important and difficult management problem facing 
the federal court system today” to justify class certification in a 1989 asbestos case); Jenkins v. 
Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that “the current volume of 
litigation and more frequent mass disasters,” as well as Congress’s refusal to address, in 
particular, the asbestos litigation crisis, explained why class treatment of claims could justifiably 
deprive individuals of the “hearings and arguments for each . . . to the extent enjoyed . . . in the 
past”). 
 62. See Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of 
Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 412 (2000) [hereinafter 
Erichson, Informal Aggregation] (noting that a “trend” in favor of class certification in mass torts 
cases “has been squelched”). 
 63. See Deborah R. Hensler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 
80 TEX. L. REV. 1899, 1906–08 (2002). 
 64. In 1995, Francis McGovern predicted that “[t]he future is in Albuterol, Norplant, RSI, 
tobacco, and Persian Gulf chemicals.”  Francis E. McGovern, Looking to the Future of Mass 
Torts: A Comment on Schuck and Siliciano, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1022, 1026 (1995).  None of 
these generated the sort of mass tort leviathan that asbestos or breast implants spawned. 
 65. See infra Part II.B. 
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3. Minimizing Deviations: Attorneys’ Fees for Class Counsel 
The contrast between the stability of the negative-value class action and 
the rise and fall of the mass tort class action suggests that a procedure can 
deviate from the individual lawsuit baseline only to the extent necessary to 
address a regulatory need.  If a practice that more closely resembles what 
happens in the individual lawsuit can handle the same need, then the more 
extreme deviation risks a deficit of social legitimacy. 
This to-the-extent-necessary limit on deviations explains why a striking 
proposal to increase fee awards in negative-value class actions66 will probably 
gain little support.  Presently, the bulk of a class action settlement, typically 
about seventy-five percent, goes to class members and not to class counsel as 
fees.67  This pattern roughly reflects how plaintiffs’ lawyers and their clients 
split the proceeds when an individual case settles.68  As a number of 
commentators have argued, however, individual members of a small-stakes 
class have no real interest in any compensation.69  If negative-value suits make 
sense as a policy matter, they do because they promise some measure of 
deterrence.70  Settlement distributions thus blunt Rule 23’s regulatory potential 
because class members with no more than a nominal interest in compensation 
get most of the settlement.  If the money went to attorneys instead, their 
incentive to file class actions, and thus deter wrongdoing, would increase.71  
Hence the proposal: courts should award up to one hundred percent of a class 
settlement in a negative-value case to class counsel.72 
Perhaps existing doctrine would permit these sorts of fees,73 but they 
would deviate from the individual baseline in two ways.  Fees of one hundred 
 
 66. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
2043, 2069–71 (2010) [hereinafter Fitzpatrick, Class Action Lawyers]. 
 67. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee 
Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 833 (2010) [hereinafter Fitzpatrick, Empirical Study]. 
 68. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal 
Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 286 (1998). 
 69. Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1961, 2018 (2007) [hereinafter Bone, Who Decides?] (observing that “compensation does 
very little justificatory work” for the small-stakes class action); Fitzpatrick, Class Action 
Lawyers, supra note 66, at 2067; Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action 
Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 104–
05 (2006). 
 70. Fitzpatrick, Class Action Lawyers, supra note 66, at 2067; Gilles & Friedman, supra 
note 69, at 139. 
 71. See Fitzpatrick, Class Action Lawyers, supra note 66, at 2069–70. 
 72. Id. at 2069–70. 
 73. Compare id. at 2075–79 (defending the doctrinal plausibility of awarding 100% of the 
class settlement to class counsel), with David Marcus, Attorneys’ Fees and the Social Legitimacy 
of Class Actions, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 157, 159–60 (2011) (challenging the doctrinal 
plausibility of this suggestion). 
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percent of the class settlement would sharply contrast with the norm of thirty-
three percent in individual litigation.  Also, the proposal flows from the denial 
that negative-value class actions have a compensatory function and thus 
juxtaposes it starkly with the individual lawsuit and its chief raison-d’être.  
The regulatory need is insufficient to push existing class action practice even 
further away from the baseline.  Inadequate attorney incentives likely result in 
few worthwhile class actions that go unfiled.74  Changed fee practices would 
only marginally amplify Rule 23’s deterrence potential, while strengthening 
arguments against the form’s legitimacy.75 
D. The Priority of Social Legitimacy 
As my final claim, I assert that the stability of a procedure, and thus the 
legitimacy this stability reflects, depend more on the social than the formal.  A 
form or practice that enjoys a deep reservoir of social legitimacy but uncertain 
formal legitimacy will remain more stable over time than one with the opposite 
endowment.  Indeed, a deep reservoir of social legitimacy can help a procedure 
remain stable in the face of exogenous shocks.76 
This priority of social legitimacy results in significant part from the few 
formal restraints procedural doctrine imposes.77  But even when the doctrine 
draws lines, a procedure with considerable social legitimacy can cross them.  
Two class action examples illustrate. 
1. Class Certification of Back Pay Claims 
An idiosyncratic application of Rule 23 to certify back pay claims in 
employment discrimination cases enjoyed decades of stability notwithstanding 
a weak doctrinal foundation. The practice began to lose favor in the 1990s, and 
in 2011 the Supreme Court ended it.  Ebbs and flows of social legitimacy 
better account for this change than an explanation couched in terms of formal 
legitimacy. 
 
 74. Linda Sandstrom Simard, Fees, Incentives, and Deterrence, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 10, 14–17 (2011). 
 75. Prominent class action proponents have long taken pains to contest the claim that class 
actions provide no compensation to individual class members.  See, e.g., In Camera, 16 CLASS 
ACTION REP. 121, 253 (1993) (demonstrating how securities class actions offer much more 
compensation to individual class members than often suggested); Abraham L. Pomerantz, Class 
Suits Defended: Actions Protect Stockholder and Small Consumer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1971, at 
F22 (defending class actions by referring to a $132 million settlement that bestowed significant 
compensation on class members). 
 76. After a decade of attacks on the legitimacy of class actions starting in the mid-1990s, for 
example, federal class action practice remained robust.  Cf. Fitzpatrick, Empirical Study, supra 
note 67, at 845 (reporting that federal district judges approved 688 class action settlements worth 
$33 billion in 2006 and 2007). 
 77. See Bone, Who Decides?, supra note 69, at 1962. 
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Class actions for money damages almost always proceed pursuant to Rule 
23(b)(3),78 which requires that issues common to the class predominate over 
individual ones, and that a class action is superior to individual actions.79  
Members of 23(b)(3) classes have a right to individual notice upon certification 
and an opportunity to opt out.80  Rule 23(b)(2), which typically applies in cases 
for injunctive or declaratory relief, has no predominance or superiority 
requirements.81  Also, members of a 23(b)(2) class have no notice or opt out 
rights.82  This comparison has two relevant implications.  Rule 23(b)(2) 
facilitates class actions, because it imposes a lesser hurdle to class certification 
than Rule 23(b)(3), and because it eschews costly procedural protections.  
Also, Rule 23(b)(2) class actions deviate even further from the individual 
lawsuit baseline than their Rule 23(b)(3) counterparts.  Notice and opt out 
rights give 23(b)(3) class members modest control over their rights to sue, if 
not what individual plaintiffs enjoy. 
Not long after Rule 23’s recreation in 1966, federal courts began to use 
Rule 23(b)(2) to certify employment discrimination classes seeking back pay.83  
They treated this type of claim for monetary compensation more favorably 
than all others, and they pushed Title VII class actions further from the 
individual lawsuit baseline than others.  The formal doctrinal justification for 
this practice did not fit the original expectations of Rule 23(b)(2)’s authors84 
and was “surprisingly weak.”85  Primarily, courts stressed that “the award of 
back pay” is “one element of the equitable remedy” contemplated by Rule 
23(b)(2).86  But Rule 23(b)(2) refers to injunctive or declaratory relief, not 
equitable relief.  By drawing a wooden distinction between law and equity to 
bring back pay claims within Rule 23(b)(2)’s aegis, courts reverted to a sort of 
disfavored formalism in procedural analysis that the 1966 revision to Rule 23 
had eradicated.87 
 
 78. See Holmes v. Cont’l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1156 (11th Cir. 1983) (explaining that 
Rule 23(b)(3) “covers” cases seeking monetary relief). 
 79. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 80. Id. 23(c)(2)(B). 
 81. See id. 23(b)(2). 
 82. Id. 23(c)(2)(A). 
 83. E.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir. 1971). 
 84. Albert M. Sacks, Assoc. Reporter, Remarks at the Meeting of the Advisory Committee 
on Civil Rules 62 (Oct. 31–Nov. 2, 1963) (declaring that Rule 23(b)(2) “is not issued with any 
thought of . . . a judgment which in effect orders the payment of money”). 
 85. George Rutherglen, Notice, Scope, and Preclusion in Title VII Class Actions, 69 VA. L. 
REV. 11, 24 (1983). 
 86. Robinson, 444 F.2d at 802; see also Holmes v. Cont’l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1152 
(11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969)). 
 87. See David Marcus, Flawed But Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for 
the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 695 (2011) [hereinafter Marcus, Flawed But 
Noble] (describing revisions to Rule 23 in 1966). 
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This “more generous” treatment of Title VII class actions facilitated their 
prosecution and thereby addressed a regulatory need keenly felt in the 1970s.88  
The “first generation” of employment discrimination litigation targeted easily 
identifiable and systemic acts.89  Courts treated the rights at stake as 
implicating “a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority” and 
insisted that their remediation warranted particular judicial energy and 
attention.90  Government enforcement of antidiscrimination measures had 
proven largely ineffective by the early 1970s.91  Given the ubiquity of 
discrimination as standard employment practice in parts of the country,92 the 
costs of litigating enough individual cases to make a difference were 
prohibitive.93  Several of the Fifth Circuit judges who wrote particularly 
influential Title VII opinions had previously recognized the class action’s 
importance, given bureaucratic laxity, to the eradication of school 
desegregation.94  They likely saw litigation history—a widespread problem of 
discrimination, an inadequate governmental response, and ineffective 
 
 88. See La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1973) (“While 
Rule 23 has no ‘civil rights version’, it is not surprising that its interpretation is more generous in 
[civil rights] case[s] than in others.”); see also Robinson, 444 F.2d at 796–97, 802. 
 89. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 465–67 (2001). 
 90. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968); see also Gay v. 
Waiters’ and Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, 549 F.2d 1330, 1331, 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), amended by 
694 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1982) (in an opinion discussing the propriety of 23(b)(2) certification of 
back pay claims, opining that “in determining whether an action alleging discriminatory 
employment practices shall be allowed to proceed as a class action, a trial court must consider the 
broad remedial purposes of Title VII and must liberally interpret and apply Rule 23 so as not to 
undermine the purpose and effectiveness of Title VII in eradicating class-based discrimination”); 
Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 340 (10th Cir. 1975) (arguing for class treatment of 
Title VII claims on grounds that they “have a broad public interest in that they seek to enforce 
fundamental constitutional principles”); Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108, 152 n.177 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975) (“The courts have been particularly cognizant of the fact that claims under Title VII 
involve the vindication of a major public interest.”). 
 91. Huff v. N. D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1973) (“The federal courts have a 
particularly vital role in cases such as this.  To them alone Congress has assigned the power to 
enforce compliance with the strictures against racial discrimination in employment.”); ALFRED 
W. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 3 (1971). 
 92. See generally John J. Donohue III & James Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic 
Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 1603 (1991) (providing various employment data showing discrimination in the 
economic and employment settings). 
 93. Cf. Belton, supra note 49, at 934 (“The development of the Title VII class action was 
critical in the private enforcement efforts.”). 
 94. Compare Sagers v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 529 F.2d 721, 724–25 (5th Cir. 1976) 
(Wisdom, J.), and Rodriguez v. E. Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 45–46 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(Wisdom, J.), and Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 29–30, 33–34 (5th Cir. 1968) 
(Brown, J.), with Marcus, Flawed But Noble, supra note 87, at 693–94. 
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individual litigation—repeat itself as civil rights advocates turned their 
attention to the workplace.95  The regulatory need for class treatment required 
the particular deviation that Rule 23(b)(2) contemplates.  Courts wanted to 
avoid the notice requirement that Rule 23(b)(3) triggers, for fear that “[t]he 
imposition of notice and the ensuing costs often discourage [Title VII] suits.”96 
In the 1990s, some courts expressed doubt about this practice.97  In 2011, 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes ended it.98  The formal basis for the Rule 
23(b)(2) certification of back pay claims may have been questionable in the 
early 1970s, but by the time the Court took the issue each circuit had accepted 
it.99  Its reservoir of social legitimacy, however, had dried up.100  By 2011, the 
perceived need to favor Title VII claims above all others had receded.  
Employment discrimination litigation in the 1970s followed closely on the 
heels of the civil rights movement; not only has civil rights litigation moved 
from the center of American political culture, it has suffered recently from the 
perception of excess.101  Litigation and other enforcement measures have 
 
 95. Belton, supra note 49, at 933 (noting connection in Fifth Circuit between school 
desegregation and employment discrimination litigation); see also Michael Selmi, Public vs. 
Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 
1401, 1427 (1998) (“Since the early 1970s, employment discrimination . . . has received more 
attention from courts and commentators than other areas of civil rights.”). 
 96. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 254 (3d Cir. 1975) (additionally 
observing that “[c]lass actions . . . are powerful stimuli to enforce Title VII”). 
 97. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 427 n.1 (5th Cir. 1998) (Dennis, J., 
dissenting) (commenting on the majority’s strained effort to distinguish back pay claims from 
other claims for monetary relief that cannot be certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2)). 
 98. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2545–46 (2011). 
 99. Brief in Opposition of Respondents at 14–15, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 
2541 (2011) (No. 10-277) (making this point and citing cases to show that “[a]ll circuits . . . agree 
that back pay may be sought under Rule 23(b)(2)”). 
 100. I do not discuss case-specific reasons for the Wal-Mart decision and its timing, but the 
terrible atmospherics for the plaintiffs merit mention.  The creators of the social science upon 
which the plaintiffs’ expert based his opinion in favor of class certification disavowed the 
expert’s analysis.  John Monahan, Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell, Contextual Evidence of 
Gender Discrimination: The Ascendance of “Social Frameworks”, 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1719 
(2008); see also Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 n.8 (noting creators’ disagreement with plaintiffs’ 
expert’s study).  The type of antidiscrimination theory the plaintiffs alleged has been criticized by 
thoughtful commentators, otherwise sympathetic to the cause, as difficult to administer as a 
matter of finding violations and crafting remedies.  See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The 
Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 34–35 (2006) 
(criticizing second generation scholars’ lack of substantive principles in analyzing workplace 
discrimination solutions on grounds that such an approach fails to provide “an operating theory of 
what is wrongful about discrimination”).  Also, Wal-Mart’s relevant employment data matched 
overall gender patterns for the economy at large.  Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the 
Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 155–56 (2009). 
 101. See Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. 
L. REV. 555, 557 & n.8 (2001). 
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ended many of the most obvious discriminatory practices among employers.102  
Plenty of data suggest that employment discrimination remains rampant,103 but 
instances are often less visible and often result from less explicit and 
sometimes subconscious biases.104  Courts have proved “reluctant” to 
remediate this type of discrimination,105 indicating either doubts to its 
possibility or skepticism about the efficacy of judicial remedy. 
Moreover, the importance of Rule 23 to employment discrimination 
litigation has waned, and with it the need to deviate further from the individual 
lawsuit baseline for Title VII claims than for others.  Class actions have been 
marginal to overall Title VII enforcement since the 1980s.106  Bringing the 
procedural treatment of back pay claims in line with others for monetary 
compensation likely will have little impact on the overall effectiveness of 
antidiscrimination laws.  Finally, the Supreme Court could be forgiven for 
wondering what, if any, benefits Rule 23(b)(2) treatment afforded Title VII 
claims.  The Ninth Circuit’s en banc opinion crafted a test for Rule 23(b)(2) 
certification that replicated Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance and superiority 
requirements in function if not form,107 and, as advocates have conceded, an 
individual notice requirement in Title VII cases probably would not hurt 
much.108 
 
 102. See PAUL FRYMER, BLACK AND BLUE: AFRICAN AMERICANS, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, 
AND THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY 83–84, 94 (2008) (describing the salutary impact 
of 1970s Title VII litigation, particularly class actions, on discrimination in organized labor). 
 103. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in 
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 118 n.45 (2009). 
 104. Sturm, supra note 89, at 460. 
 105. Bagenstos, supra note 100, at 23. 
 106. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1019 (1991) (observing that employment 
discrimination class actions have “virtually vanished from the scene”); 1991 Federal Court Class 
Action Statistics, 14 CLASS ACTION REP. 284, 285 (1991) (charting the decline in civil rights 
class actions). 
 107. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 617 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 795 
(2010) (listing four factors for courts to consider when deciding whether monetary relief 
“predominates” over injunctive or declaratory relief: “whether the monetary relief sought 
determines the key procedures that will be used, whether it introduces new and significant legal 
and factual issues, whether it requires individualized hearings, and whether its size and nature—
as measured by recovery per class member—raise particular due process and manageability 
concerns”). 
 108. See, e.g., Letter from Theodore M. Shaw, Assoc. Dir.-Counsel, NAACP Legal Def. & 
Educ. Fund, Inc., to J. Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure (June 11, 1996), in 2 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL 
RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, at 94, 96 (1997) (opposing an 
amendment to Rule 23(c)(e), which would require notice in all Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, but 
acknowledging that notice would be feasible in employment discrimination class actions). 
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2. Class Certification of Truth in Lending Act Claims 
An episode in the history of Truth in Lending Act109 (“TILA”) litigation 
also illustrates the priority of social legitimacy over formal legitimacy to the 
overall stability of a procedure.  As enacted in 1968, TILA enabled plaintiffs to 
recover a penalty of up to $1,000 with no showing of actual damages if the 
lender did not make certain required disclosures.110  The statute fit Rule 
23(b)(3) like a glove, as a TILA case for the statutory penalty presented no 
individual issues and thus satisfied Rule 23(b)(3).111  But to many judges, 
certified TILA classes had troubling implications.  A picayune violation of the 
statute by a large lender could generate tens of thousands of $1,000 claims.  
Aggregated into one case, these claims could inflict in one blow “a horrendous, 
possibly annihilating punishment, unrelated to any damage.”112  For most 
courts, distaste for this seemingly distorted consequence, not the “technical 
application of Rule 23,” as one judge candidly admitted, required a denial of 
class certification.113  Congress ratified this judicial mutiny in 1973 by placing 
an upward limit on a lender’s total class action liability when plaintiffs had no 
actual damages.114 
Since TILA and Rule 23 fit well together as a doctrinal matter, concerns of 
social legitimacy better explain the instability of early 1970s TILA class action 
practice.  Cases for statutory penalties deviated significantly from the 
individual lawsuit ideal-type.  By design, TILA plaintiffs were vehicles for 
creditor regulation and did not pursue some kind of individualized 
 
 109. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. I, 82 Stat. 146 (1968). 
 110. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1)–(2)(A) (2006); see also Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 474 F.2d 
336, 339 n.3 (10th Cir. 1973) (reprinting relevant part of TILA as enacted in 1968). 
 111. Wilcox, 474 F.2d at 343 (“[W]e agree that there is nothing in the Act itself, the Rule, or 
the notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to it which 
expressly or impliedly precludes class actions in this type of case.”).  But see Richard A. 
Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1069, 1081–85, 1082 n.64 (2011) (defending refusal to certify TILA claims as a sensible 
application of Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement). 
 112. Ratner v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see also 
Mathews v. Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 479, 479–80 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Linn v. 
Target Stores, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 469, 472, 475 (D. Minn. 1973) (denying class certification motion 
and referring to the “potentially devastating effect on defendants”); Garza v. Chi. Health Clubs, 
Inc., 56 F.R.D. 548, 549 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (denying class certification on grounds that “the 
minimum recovery would be devastating for a small company”). 
 113. Linn, 61 F.R.D. at 473, 475; see also Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 763 n.9 
(3d Cir. 1974) (citing cases in which forty of fifty-one district courts that denied motions for class 
actions under TILA); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLASS ACTIONS BROUGHT IN FEDERAL COURTS 
UNDER SECTION 130 OF THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT (1976) (compiling a list of cases).  But see 
Beard v. King Appliance Co., 61 F.R.D. 434, 440 (E.D. Va. 1973) (refusing to deny class 
certification based on a concern about “the harsh result predicted by defendants,” reasoning that 
such an argument is “a legislative or political, and not a judicial, determination”). 
 114. Pub. L. No. 93-495, Title IV, § 408(a)(2)(B), 88 Stat. 1500, 1518 (1974). 
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compensation.115  A regulatory need might have motivated private TILA 
enforcement, but the disquieting prospect that a defendant could have to 
surrender tens of millions of dollars without any demonstration of actual injury 
weakened the case for it.  Even TILA’s congressional defenders accepted that 
TILA class litigation was imbalanced and needed re-setting.116 
* * * 
To offer an abbreviated summary of my argument thus far: the stability of 
a procedure is often observable evidence that it is legitimate because it can 
indicate that the procedure measures up by many of the metrics people use to 
evaluate legitimacy.  This stability results more from perceptions of efficacy 
and less from formal doctrine.  Stability on its own does not suggest anything 
normatively meaningful about legitimacy, but it indicates what social 
consensus deems legitimate and can thereby point toward explanations about 
what matters to perceptions of efficacy.  The stable individual lawsuit baseline, 
for example, helps isolate the sorts of regulatory needs that enabled deviations 
like certain class action procedures to stabilize. 
A final thought is in order before moving on.  A procedure’s observable 
stability serves as a trustworthy outward manifestation of legitimacy only if 
perceptions are informed and reasoned.  If dysfunctions interfere with social 
perceptions, a procedure’s persistence could indicate nothing more than 
confusion.  Occluded perceptions, in other words, could enable a bad 
procedure nonetheless to persist.  Recent trends in the law of aggregate 
litigation raise just this possibility—that practices can become entrenched not 
because they are seen as legitimate, but because they are not seen at all.  
Professor Resnik has written eloquently about these sorts of developments for 
years.  In the next Part, I join her chorus. 
II.  PROCEDURAL STABILITY IN CONTRACT’S WAKE 
I find support for my account of procedural legitimacy, with its emphasis 
on social perceptions, in the notion of “publicity” that Professor Resnik takes 
 
 115. See COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, TRUTH IN LENDING ACT 
AMENDMENTS, S. REP. NO. 93-278, at 14 (1973) (“The purpose of the civil penalties section 
under Truth in Lending was to provide creditors with a meaningful incentive to comply with the 
law without relying upon an extensive new bureaucracy.”); see also Inaccurate and Unfair 
Billing Practices: Hearings on S. 1630 and S. 914 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Credit of 
the Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 93d Cong. 166 (1973) (statement of Mark 
Silbergeld, Attorney, Consumer Union, Washington Office) (agreeing that the purpose of TILA 
class actions is not to “reward or enrich the consumers” but to “provide a meaningful, effective 
penalty so that you can get compliance”). 
 116. S. REP. NO. 93-278, at 35 (1973) (statement of Sen. William Proxmire and Sen. William 
D. Hathaway) (supporting a proposal to put an upward limit on a creditor’s class action liability, 
but complaining that the upward limit in the proposed legislation was too low). 
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from Jeremy Bentham.117  She has explained how the public’s gaze is central 
to assessments of procedural legitimacy: 
Fairness requires . . . participation from those outside a litigation triangle, 
invited to partake in interactive exchanges that produce, confirm, or reject 
legal rules.  That publicity enables assessments of whether procedures and 
decisionmakers are fair and permits an understanding of the impact of 
resources . . . of the treatment of similarly situated litigants, and of why one 
would want to get into (or avoid) court.  The presence of the public divests 
both the government and private litigants of control over the meanings of the 
claims made and the judgments rendered and enables popular debate about and 
means to seek revision of law’s content and application. 
. . .  Without authorization for an audience to have a discrete and 
protected place . . . one has no way to assess the practices or understand how 
nuanced law application can be.  Indeed, it is the performance of fairness 
before the public that legitimates adjudication.118 
Professor Resnik fears that publicity, with its legitimizing potential, may prove 
a victim to a recent trend in civil litigation.119  She rightly observes that 
“procedure is being swallowed up by contract.”120  Bargains for particularized 
processes that deviate from the procedural norm tend to block the public’s 
view into dispute resolution.  Professor Resnik particularly worries that the 
loss of publicity that contracted-for procedure entails erodes the capacity of 
civil processes to “offer[] to democratic governance . . . occasions to observe 
the exercise of state authority and to participate . . . in norm generation.”121 
I find “contract procedure” disquieting for a similar reason.122  The 
replacement of court-centered processes and the publicity they enable with 
contractual idiosyncrasy degrades the quality of social perceptions of 
legitimacy.  The stability of a particular procedure cannot reflect its legitimacy 
if it does not result from informed assessments of its efficacy.  This problem 
occurs when parties by contract opt out of courts entirely and into privatized 
mechanisms for dispute resolution.123  But even when the parties’ bargained-
 
 117. E.g., Resnik, Bring Back Bentham, supra note 10, at 4–5; see also id. at 15–44. 
 118. Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 10, at 87. 
 119. E.g., Resnik, Bring Back Bentham, supra note 10, at 52–53; Resnik, Compared to 
What?, supra note 5, at 694–98; Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 10, at 132. 
 120. Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 10, at 93. 
 121. Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1102 (2006); 
see also Judith Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and Death of 
Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173, 191 (2003); Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and 
Discovering How the Public Dimensions of Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 521, 526–37 (2006). 
 122. For this term, see Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 3, at 594. 
 123. I refer here to arbitration.  Cf. Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 10, at 124 
(describing difficulty getting accurate data on what happens in arbitrations and observing that “a 
full account of process and outcomes for class arbitrations remains elusive”). 
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for processes leave disputes in court, contract tends to disrupt the public’s gaze 
by reducing the number of participants who can comment on a procedure’s 
acceptability and opportunities to contest legitimacy. 
I use a development in the law of aggregate litigation to defend this claim.  
For years, the class action has served as the chief alternative adjudicatory form 
to the individual lawsuit.124  Proceduralists could readily assess its legitimacy, 
because the rigorous and detailed procedural rules that regulated class actions 
fostered significant scrutiny.  At present, what I call the “informal aggregation 
model” is poised to replace the class action as this alternative.  An example, as 
I discuss below, is the litigation involving first responders allegedly injured by 
the inhalation of toxic dust at Ground Zero.  Contract regulates this model, and 
it does so in a manner that diminishes opportunities for a wide range of 
potentially interested parties to challenge the model’s efficacy.  The model 
deviates from the individual lawsuit baseline, but indicators as to whether it 
does so legitimately are lacking. 
A. Judging Legitimacy: The Class Action 
Lawyers have long utilized procedures other than the class action as 
alternatives to the individual lawsuit.125  But none other flourished in so many 
substantive fields or maintained the same hold on the legal imagination.126  The 
class action departs starkly from the baseline, most importantly because 
lawyers acquire power over and can settle plaintiffs’ claims without their 
consent.  To compensate for this loss of control, a detailed set of procedural 
requirements regulates the class action.127  These rules ensure that adequate 
interest representation, which legitimates nonconsensual claim joinder, 
exists.128  These procedures have a positive externality.  By opening up and 
 
 124. Id. at 135. 
 125. See, e.g., Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story—An Instance of Successful Mass 
Disaster Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116, 121–28 (1968) (discussing creation of the MER/29 
Group, a group of plaintiffs’ attorneys pursuing prescription drug mass tort litigation as a group 
to, among other things, share information and defray costs).  The multi-district litigation system 
has existed since 1968 and has been used with ever-increasing frequency since then. Deborah R. 
Hensler, The Role of Multi-Districting in Mass Tort Litigation: An Empirical Investigation, 31 
SETON HALL L. REV. 883, 896 (2001); see also Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee, III, From 
Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 775, 793–94 (2010). 
 126. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client 
Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 519 (2003) 
[hereinafter Erichson, Beyond the Class Action] (“Class actions get all the attention.”). 
 127. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (providing the procedural rules for the settlement, 
voluntary dismissal, or compromise of class actions). 
 128. See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 913, 958–59 (1998). 
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regularizing class action litigation in at least four ways, they facilitate informed 
judgments about its legitimacy. 
First, a single rule governs class action practice, meaning that cases deviate 
from the baseline in consistent ways.  Rule 23 regulates a judge’s supervisory 
role, for example, as well as class members’ procedural rights.  These 
important determinants of class action efficacy therefore remain the same from 
case to case.  The class action routine under Rule 23 helps create a stable and 
rich substrate for assessments of legitimacy. 
The regularity of class action practice also results from a second feature.  
Rule 23 vests judges with considerable power to manage class actions, but also 
an obligation to explain their decisions.  Judges—not the parties—appoint 
counsel;129 they determine whether to permit claim joinder; they approve 
notice plans;130 they sign off on settlements;131 and they set attorneys’ fees.132  
As they make these decisions, judges should and typically do provide 
reasons.133  An extensive body of caselaw on how and why class action 
practice deviates from the individual lawsuit baseline has accordingly 
emerged. 
Third, Rule 23 requires multiple decision points, at which a uniquely broad 
array of constituencies with conflicting preferences have opportunities to 
debate the process.  These multiple ports of entry, open to multiple 
participants, maximize the range of claims about class action legitimacy.  
When the court appoints class counsel, not only defendants but competing 
plaintiffs’ firms have an opportunity to criticize each other’s practices.134  A 
defendant that contests class certification has an incentive not only to criticize 
the class action’s effects on corporate and other typical targets, but also to 
identify harms to absent class members that the device can cause.135  The rule 
provides particularly generous opportunities for an extensive set of 
 
 129. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1). 
 130. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c). 
 131. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
 132. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h). 
 133. See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 
794 (3d Cir. 1995) (“There is no explicit requirement in Rule 23 that the district judge make a 
formal finding that the requisites of the rule have been met in order to certify a class.  However, 
most district judges have routinely done so, assuming that it was required, and in published 
opinions, a number of courts have endorsed or at least acknowledged the compelling policy 
reasons for doing so.”); Besinga v. United States, 923 F.2d 133, 135 (9th Cir. 1991) (arguing for 
“a bright line rule requiring trial courts to certify a class in a written order which clearly sets out 
the class’s compliance with Rule 23”). 
 134. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)–(2) (setting forth the factors the court must consider in 
appointing class counsel and specifying that, where more than one adequate class counsel seeks 
appointment, the court must choose the applicant best able to represent the class). 
 135. E.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 805–06 (1985) (explaining why 
defendants have an interest in advocating for the due process rights of absent class members). 
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constituencies to weigh in at settlement.  The district court has a heightened 
obligation to scrutinize the proposed terms carefully,136 going well beyond its 
obligation to evaluate the settlement of individual actions.137  Objectors with 
separate counsel can participate.138  Finally, litigants have unusually easy 
access to an appellate court,139 whose lack of docket-clearing incentive enables 
a disinterested review.  This appellate review can extend to settlements, which 
in individual lawsuits ascend the judicial ladder only in unusual circumstances. 
Fourth, the class action’s doctrinal routinization has enabled the emergence 
of organized and sophisticated groups with predictable and conflicting 
preferences.  The redundancy of controversial issues in class action litigation 
has justified the investment by corporate and consumer advocates to invest in 
research and lobbying.  A robust public discourse on class actions has persisted 
for decades. 
B. Judging Legitimacy in the Twilight of the Class Action 
Most aspects of class action practice remained stable from the late 1970s to 
2011.  The richly informed and thoroughly ventilated arguments that the class 
action architecture facilitated made this stability a trustworthy indicator that 
the adjudicatory form proved satisfactory by diverse metrics of legitimacy.  
But this stability has disappeared, as the class action has suffered a mortal 
wound.  In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court ruled, in 
effect, that prospective defendants can immunize themselves from class action 
litigation by coupling a class action waiver with an arbitration clause in an 
adhesive contract.140  The decision will not affect a few areas of class action 
practice, but, without a congressional response, the decision may well derail 
much of it.141 
Concepcion opens the door to an informal mechanism of claim aggregation 
to take on the class action’s role as the chief alternative to the individual 
lawsuit.  The foundation for this informal aggregation model includes several 
 
 136. E.g., Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 593 (3d Cir. 2010) (describing the 
district court’s obligation to act as fiduciary at settlement). 
 137. Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 1984) (“In ordinary 
litigation, . . . courts recognize that settlement of the dispute is solely in the hands of the 
parties.”). 
 138. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5) (allowing any class member to object to the proposed 
settlement). 
 139. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002) (allowing “nonnamed” objectors to a 
settlement to appeal without first intervening); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
 140. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744, 1746, 1753 (2011). 
 141. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 639–40 (2012) (describing Concepcion’s 
likely reach). 
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contractual planks.  Unlike class actions, this architecture frustrates, rather than 
facilitates, social perceptions of efficacy. 
1. Informal Aggregation 
For decades, primarily in mass tort cases, lawyers and courts have grouped 
large numbers of claims together without recourse to Rule 23.142  Two traits 
characterize this informal model of aggregation.  The first has to do with the 
mechanics of claim initiation and the binding reach of the judgment.  In class 
actions, people become plaintiffs by operation of law, i.e., the class 
certification decision.  Also, judicial approval yields a settlement that binds all 
class members who have not opted out.  In the informal aggregation model, 
contract, not judicial fiat regulated by procedural rule, predominates.  The 
plaintiffs’ lawyer represents tens, hundreds, or even thousands of plaintiffs in 
one litigation, but he acquires power over their claims by entering into 
representation agreements with each.143  Likewise, each plaintiff must consent 
to—that is, opt into—any settlement that the plaintiffs’ lawyer negotiates.144  
Formally, the informal aggregation model deviates less from the individual 
lawsuit baseline than the class action. 
The second trait has to do with the actual prosecution of the litigation.  The 
attorney-client relationship exists on paper in the informal aggregation model, 
but otherwise the actual connection between lawyer and plaintiff is marginal.  
Although the plaintiffs’ lawyer files separate lawsuits for each plaintiff, he has 
no intention of litigating them independently.  Rather, discovery proceeds in a 
consolidated fashion, and the plaintiffs’ lawyer hopes for a single aggregate 
settlement for the entire inventory of cases at once.145  Functionally, the 
informal aggregation model better resembles the class action than the 
individual lawsuit baseline. 
Until recently, the centrality of contract to the informal aggregation model 
disadvantaged it vis-à-vis the class action.  A defendant facing thousands of 
claims will want a settlement that resolves most or all of its outstanding 
liability.146  Rule 23 maps an easily traveled path to this sort of global peace.  
The stroke of a judge’s pen joins claims together, pronounces a class-wide 
settlement final, and thus is all it takes to resolve the defendant’s liability.  
Informally aggregated litigation amounts to a bundle of individual cases.  In 
order for a single settlement to bind all the plaintiffs, the lawyers must 
 
 142. See generally Erichson, Informal Aggregation, supra note 62, at 386–400 (documenting 
“the rise of informal aggregation,” predominantly in mass torts cases). 
 143. See, e.g., Erichson, Beyond the Class Action, supra note 126, at 532 (noting that each 
plaintiff signs an individual retainer agreement). 
 144. Id. at 533. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. 
REV. 265, 271 (2011). 
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convince each one to consent to it.  The default position is reversed; informally 
aggregated plaintiffs must opt in while class members opt out.  Also, the 
transaction costs of getting global peace are much higher. 
Starting in the late 1990s,147 a mechanism deployed in informally 
aggregated litigation, the so-called “all-or-nothing” settlement, has closed this 
global peace gap.148  Defendants propose an aggregate settlement, but require 
that a supermajority of plaintiffs, typically around ninety percent,149 agree to 
the deal’s terms before any money changes hands.  Because attorneys’ fees do 
not vest until this threshold of consent is reached, a plaintiffs’ lawyer with a 
large inventory has an incentive to market the settlement aggressively to all of 
her clients.150  A client could resist her attorney’s entreaties that she settle, but 
she would have nowhere to go if she wanted to pursue her litigation.  Any 
plaintiffs’ lawyer competent to go toe-to-toe with the well-funded defendant 
would have an inventory of his own and thus would be similarly incentivized 
to exert pressure.151  Global peace still requires consent from large numbers of 
plaintiffs, but the all-or-nothing mechanism leverages the only source of advice 
these plaintiffs have—their lawyers—to get this comprehensive buy-in. 
As the sun sets on the class action, the informal aggregation model with 
the “all-or-nothing” settlement mechanism might become the chief alternative 
to the individual lawsuit.152  In 2009, the American Law Institute blessed this 
sort of informal aggregation in its Principles of the Law of Aggregate 
Litigation by providing rules for its governance.153  For the Reporter, the 
project’s “single greatest contribution” is its aggregate settlement principle, 
which is designed to create paths to global peace without Rule 23.154 
 
 147. Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 
1105, 1155 (2010) [hereinafter Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation] (observing that the first effort 
at an all-or-nothing settlement came in 1990s asbestos litigation). 
 148. See generally Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 979 (2010) [hereinafter Erichson, Trouble] (defining “all-or-nothing” settlements). 
 149. Nancy J. Moore, The American Law Institute’s Draft Proposal to Bypass the Aggregate 
Settlement Rule: Do Mass Tort Clients Need (or Want) Group Decision Making?, 57 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 395, 403 (2008). 
 150. See Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation, supra note 147, at 1156 (discussing this 
incentive in the context of the Vioxx aggregate settlement). 
 151. See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 146, at 280 (discussing this phenomenon as it 
played out in the Vioxx aggregate settlement); Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation, supra note 
147, at 1156 (discussing the same phenomenon). 
 152. See Johnson v. Nextel Commc’ns, Inc., 660 F.3d 131, 134–35 (2d Cir. 2011) (describing 
a variant of an all-or-nothing arrangement in an employment discrimination case); see also 
Erichson, Trouble, supra note 148, at 995 (“Not all troublesome aggregate settlements involve 
product liability or mass torts.”). 
 153. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §§ 3.16–3.17 
(2010) [hereinafter ALI, PRINCIPLES]. 
 154. Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 146, at 292–93 (quoting Professor Samuel Issacharoff). 
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2. An Example: The World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation 
The World Trade Center (“WTC”) Disaster Site Litigation illustrates how 
the informal aggregation model, dominated by contract, works.155  In 2003, a 
personal injury lawyer named David Worby filed a suit against New York City 
on behalf of a police officer, who happened to coach his son’s hockey team.156  
This first plaintiff had worked at Ground Zero right after 9/11.157  He alleged 
he developed leukemia because the city did not adequately protect him from 
exposure to toxic dust.158  Word spread among the tightly knit community of 
New York City first responders, and soon Worby had more requests for 
representation than he could handle.159  He turned to Paul Napoli, an 
experienced mass torts lawyer, for help.160  At a press conference on 
September 13, 2004, Worby and Napoli announced they had filed more than 
800 cases and would pursue a class action.161  The case had no chance of 
getting certified.  Indeed, the court denied class certification at a status 
conference without as much as a written order.162  But the announcement, 
along with the toll-free number Worby and Napoli established (1-877-WTC-
HERO),163 steered more than 9,000 individual clients their way.164  Other 
lawyers signed up hundreds more.165 
Ten thousand individual cases made their way to Alvin Hellerstein of the 
Southern District of New York.166  He consolidated them for pre-trial case 
management and agreed that Worby and Napoli would serve as lead plaintiff’s 
 
 155. For a partial summary of this litigation, see generally Robin J. Effron, Event Jurisdiction 
and Protective Coordination: Lessons from the September 11th Litigation, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 
199, 203–20 (2008) (describing the litigation as well as its doctrinal and pragmatic problems).  
For a journalistic account, see generally ANTHONY DEPALMA, CITY OF DUST: ILLNESS, 
ARROGANCE, AND 9/11 (2011) [hereinafter DEPALMA, CITY OF DUST]. 
 156. Anthony DePalma, 9/11 Lawyer Made Name in Lawsuit on Diet Pills, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
30, 2008, at 23 [hereinafter DePalma, 9/11 Lawyer]. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. DEPALMA, CITY OF DUST, supra note 155, at 247. 
 160. DePalma, 9/11 Lawyer, supra note 156. 
 161. First Major Class Action Lawsuit Filed for Ground Zero Cleanup Workers Afflicted with 
“WTC Toxic Diseases”, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 13, 2004. 
 162. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (citing to the transcript of the status conference on October 28, 2004). 
 163. DEPALMA, CITY OF DUST, supra note 155, at 255. 
 164. Mark Hamblett, Hellerstein Praises ‘Very Good’ WTC Deal, N.Y. L.J., June 11, 2010, at 
1. 
 165. Worby and Napoli represented more than 9,000 plaintiffs.  Id.  Another firm represented 
close to 700, and various firms represented about 300.  Mark Hamblett, Parties Campaign 
Aggressively for Participation in 9/11 Pact, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 8, 2010, at 1 [hereinafter Hamblett, 
Parties Campaign Aggressively]. 
 166. Hamblett, Parties Campaign Aggressively, supra note 165. 
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counsel.167  In the midst of extensive skirmishing over jurisdiction and various 
immunities,168 Judge Hellerstein appointed special masters to organize the 
cases, involving more than 350 different medical conditions allegedly caused 
by WTC dust.169  The special masters gathered extensive medical and other 
information from all the plaintiffs, and then identified 200 of those most 
seriously injured.170  From these cases, the parties and Judge Hellerstein 
selected thirty to proceed through full-blown discovery and trial.171  By 
generating information about the value of particular types of claims, these 
bellwether cases would provide “[a] basis for settlement” for all 10,000.172 
In March 2010, two months before the first trial dates, Napoli and Worby 
announced that they and the city had reached a deal to settle all the cases.173  
The city would pay as much as $657 million, with a grid accounting for the 
seriousness of the injury and the claim’s strength to generate each plaintiff’s 
share.174  Crucially, the agreement would go into effect only if ninety-five 
percent of plaintiffs opted into it.175  Judge Hellerstein was unenthused.  He 
complained that the grid’s complexities “would make a Talmudic scholar’s 
head spin,” denounced the short deadline of ninety days within which plaintiffs 
had to decide what do,176 and lamented the agreement’s proposal to set fees at 
thirty-three percent of each plaintiff’s compensation.177  In a dramatic 
courtroom scene, Judge Hellerstein stood to address the plaintiffs and vowed to 
do what he could to scuttle the deal.178 
 
 167. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 
2005) (Case Mgmt. Order No. 2). 
 168. E.g., In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 521 F.3d 169, 173–77 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(describing procedural history of the case and considering various state and federal immunity 
defenses). 
 169. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH), 2006 WL 3627760, 
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2006) (order appointing special masters); DEPALMA, CITY OF DUST, 
supra note 155, at 276. 
 170. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 171. Id. (describing the case management plan). 
 172. Id. at 505; see also Mark Hamblett, Plan is Implemented to Resolve Complex Suits in 
WTC Cleanup, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 25, 2009, at 1 (describing the plan). 
 173. Mark Hamblett, Settlement Reached in 9/11 Respiratory Cases, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 12, 2010, 
at 1. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Mireya Navarro, Empathetic Judge in 9/11 Suits Seen by Some as Interfering, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 3, 2010, at A17. 
 176. Noeleen G. Walder, More Work is Needed to Reach a Fair 9/11 Settlement, Judge Says, 
N.Y. L.J., Mar. 22, 2010, at 1. 
 177. Id. 
 178. DEPALMA, CITY OF DUST, supra note 155, at 320–21. 
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The parties bristled at Judge Hellerstein’s meddling, and Napoli asked the 
Second Circuit to order him to stay out.179  But the parties soon returned with a 
revised deal.180  The June 2010 settlement capped the city’s liability at $712.5 
million.181  Twenty-five percent of each plaintiff’s recovery would go to his or 
her lawyer.182  As before, money would only change hands once ninety-five 
percent of all 10,000 claimants signed on.183  To get their compensation, 
settling plaintiffs would submit claims to a medical panel and a claims 
administrator, with a right to appeal the initial decision to mass torts guru 
Kenneth Feinberg.184  Judge Hellerstein reacted more favorably.  “It’s not 
perfect, but it’s very, very good,” he said,185 and he gave the proposed 
settlement his blessing.186  Judge Hellerstein, Feinberg, and the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers set about selling the settlement to the 10,000 individual plaintiffs.187  
By 9/11’s tenth anniversary, ninety-nine percent had agreed to settle their cases 
pursuant to the aggregate deal’s terms,188 leaving only seventy-eight cases 
remaining for further litigation.189  The plaintiffs’ lawyers received close to 
$200 million in fees, with Napoli and Worby taking the lion’s share.190 
Contract regulated the WTC litigation in the two respects typical of the 
informal aggregation model.  First, Napoli and Worby used individual client 
consent, not a judicial decree, to acquire control over and join together an 
inventory of claims.  Second, the settlement took effect not because Judge 
Hellerstein said so, but because individual clients agreed to its terms.  
Otherwise, the WTC litigation resembled a class action.  All of the city’s 
potential liability was organized into one litigation unit for pre-trial case 
 
 179. E.g., Mark Hamblett, City Asks Circuit to Override Judge’s Rejection of 9/11 Pact, N.Y. 
L.J., Apr. 15, 2010, at 1; Navarro, supra note 175. 
 180. A. G. Sulzberger & Mireya Navarro, Accord on Bigger Settlement for Ill 9/11 Workers, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010, at A1. 
 181. See id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Sulzberger & Navarro, supra note 180. 
 186. Id.; see also Mark Hamblett, Hellerstein Approves Respiratory Illness Settlement for 
9/11 Workers, N.Y. L.J., June 24, 2010, at 1. 
 187. See, e.g., David B. Caruso, Choice for 9/11 Rescue Workers is to Accept $713 Million 
Deal or Hope for Passage of Federal Compensation Bill, N.Y. L.J., June 14, 2010, at 2 
(documenting Feinberg’s efforts); Mireya Navarro, With 9/11 Settlement Letters, Tough 
Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2010, at A16 [hereinafter Navarro, Tough Decisions] 
(documenting Hellerstein’s and Napoli’s efforts); Hamblett, Parties Campaign Aggressively, 
supra note 165. 
 188. Mireya Navarro, Terms Met, Payout Rises for Workers at 9/11 Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
13, 2011, at A28 [hereinafter Navarro, Terms Met]. 
 189. Mark Hamblett, Judge Sets Timetable to Handle Remaining 9/11-Related Claims, N.Y. 
L.J., Apr. 20, 2011, at 1. 
 190. See Navarro, Terms Met, supra note 188. 
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management,191 enabling Napoli and Worby to spread the considerable 
litigation costs across thousands of individual claims.  The parties’ endgame 
was a single settlement deal that would render global peace. 
3. The Problem of Judging Legitimacy 
The informal aggregation model’s resemblance to the class action means 
that it deviates from the individual lawsuit baseline.  But whereas a class 
action’s procedural rigor facilitates social perceptions and thus judgments of 
legitimacy, the informal model’s architecture occludes them. 
First, no specialized procedural rules regulate informally aggregated cases, 
which, after all, are just individually filed lawsuits.  Their litigation deviates 
from the individual lawsuit baseline in a more muddled and haphazard way 
than the class action, frustrating determinations of whether regulatory need 
justifies departures.  Nothing determines, for example, the procedural 
protections individual plaintiffs have or what happens when the lawyers agree 
to settle. 
Judge Hellerstein’s attempt to block the first proposed settlement 
highlights the paucity of procedural regulation at a crucial moment for any 
aggregate litigation.  Unlike the power Rule 23 gives them, judges supervising 
informally aggregated cases have no more formal say over settlement decisions 
than they have over any privately negotiated contract.192  Judge Hellerstein 
acted like a class action judge, but his authority to do so was questionable at 
best.193  His own explanation for why he could block the settlement effort 
showed the emperor without formal legal clothes: “This is 9/11.  This is a case 
that has dominated my docket, and because of that, I have the power of 
review.”194 
Likewise, Rule 23 permits a judge to appoint separate counsel when 
conflicts arise among class members or between class counsel and some class 
members.195  The judge has no more formal authority to do the same in 
informally aggregated cases than he or she does in individual actions.  In that 
context courts reluctantly exercise this power.196  While marketing the second 
 
 191. Cf. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation, supra note 147, at 1154–55 (describing this 
phenomenon in the Vioxx litigation). 
 192. See Alexandra N. Rothman, Note, Bringing an End to the Trend: Cutting Judicial 
“Approval” and “Rejection” Out of Non-Class Mass Settlement, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 350–
52 (2011). 
 193. See Mark Hamblett, Judge’s Rejection of 9/11 Settlement Raises Questions About His 
Asserted ‘Power of Review’, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 23, 2010, at 1 (quoting Howard Erichson and 
Geoffrey Miller expressing doubt that Judge Hellerstein had power to reject the first proposed 
settlement). 
 194. Id. (quoting Judge Hellerstein). 
 195. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g). 
 196. E.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979). 
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settlement agreement to his clients, Napoli asked Judge Hellerstein to dismiss 
some of their cases.197  If granted, the total number of claims would have 
decreased, putting the 95% threshold closer in reach and with it hundreds of 
millions in attorneys’ fees.198  Noting the obvious conflict of interest, Judge 
Hellerstein appointed separate counsel for those disfavored clients.199  But 
Napoli refused to cooperate, protesting that Judge Hellerstein purported to 
meddle with the attorney-client relationship.200  When he ordered Napoli to 
cooperate, Judge Hellerstein again stressed that “[t]his is a unique litigation” to 
justify his decision.201 
Without regulation by rule, informally aggregated litigation resists 
routinization.  A second point of contrast with class actions exacerbates this 
hurdle for the evaluation of procedural legitimacy.  A judge supervising 
informally aggregated cases has less power at crucial moments and 
correspondingly has a lesser obligation to issue reasoned decisions.  Nothing 
like the class certification decision exists for the informal aggregation 
model.202  To a significant extent, the plaintiffs’ lawyers present the judge with 
a fait accompli, having compiled inventories of cases before the judge can 
weigh in on their joinder.203  As noted, judicial power at settlement is 
questionable, so a reasoned opinion on a settlement’s fairness would be largely 
advisory.  The judge’s power over pre-trial proceedings remains nearly total, as 
Judge Hellerstein’s creative approach to case management suggests.  But 
judges typically memorialize these sorts of decisions, if at all, in case 
management orders, not published opinions.204  Judge Hellerstein’s order for 
special masters and bellwether trials is an exception;205 otherwise an interested 
person can get a sense of how the litigation proceeded only with a PACER 
password and the patience to sift through an epic and disorganized docket 
sheet. 
 
 197. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 769 F. Supp. 2d 650, 653–54 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
 198. See supra notes 183–90 and accompanying text. 
 199. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 769 F. Supp. 2d at 656–57. 
 200. See id. at 657. 
 201. Id. 
 202. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”) decides when cases can be 
aggregated through the multidistrict litigation system, 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006), but its short 
orders provide no illumination.  See, e.g., In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d 
1371 (J.P.M.L. 2005) (providing an illustrative example of the terse orders the JPML issues). 
 203. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1358–59, 1364–65 (1995). 
 204. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Managerial Judge Goes to Trial, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 
1261, 1292 (2010). 
 205. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 498, 501–05 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (providing a case management plan in a published decision). 
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A third feature worsens the problem.  Whereas a class action’s multiple 
decision points give shifting alignments of parties with conflicting incentives 
opportunities to argue about procedural legitimacy, the informal aggregation 
model’s architecture includes fewer such doors.  In some instances, the court 
has less power to appoint the lead plaintiffs’ attorney, so competing candidates 
have a less formal opportunity to critique each other.206  Allegations of 
misconduct stemming from an earlier mass tort have dogged Napoli for 
years.207  When Napoli appeared on behalf of over ninety percent of the 
plaintiffs,208 however, Judge Hellerstein had little choice but to “designate” 
him as co-liaison counsel.209  The defendant in a class action has a significant 
incentive to contest class certification, because an order certifying a class turns 
a case for a single claim into one for hundreds, thousands, or millions.  
Informal aggregation does not multiply the defendant’s liability, since it only 
occurs after plaintiffs file numerous individual actions.  If anything, 
aggregation serves the defendant’s interests, as it lessens litigation costs while 
leaving the total number of claims unchanged.  After the parties agree to settle 
and all incentives align, there are no formal avenues for soliciting the opinions 
of objectors, and no obvious paths anyone can follow to a disinterested 
appellate court. 
4. Consent as an Inadequate Substitute for Procedural Legitimacy 
Contract has the effect of pushing litigation out of sight because, at least in 
theory, it removes the justification for public examination of civil processes.  It 
creates an avenue for consent and thus individual control over procedure.  If 
plaintiffs can actually agree to join their claims together, then the need for 
procedural regulation of the decision to aggregate, and the scrutiny it 
engenders, diminish.  Likewise, if plaintiffs affirmatively want to settle their 
 
 206. See, e.g., infra notes 207–09 and accompanying text.  This is not so for cases aggregated 
pursuant to the multi-district litigation system provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1407.  See Charles 
Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District 
Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 118–19 (2010) (discussing judicial 
power to appoint counsel in MDLs).  The WTC Disaster Litigation was not aggregated pursuant 
to section 1407.  See Rothman, supra note 192, at 321. 
 207. In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 236 F. Supp. 2d 445, 459–60 (E.D. Pa. 2002) 
(finding the medical findings submitted by Napoli unreasonable); Lester Brickman, The Use of 
Litigation Screenings in Mass Torts: A Formula for Fraud?, 61 SMU L. REV. 1221, 1259–61 
(2008) (discussing Napoli’s role in submitting unreasonable medical findings in In re Diet Drugs 
Products Liability Litigation); Anthony Lin, Law Firm Can Sue on Behalf of Clients It Referred 
in Global Fen-Phen Litigation, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 9, 2004, at 1 (discussing a New York judge’s 
decision to permit a referring firm to sue Napoli’s firm for breach of contract, fraud, breach of 
fiduciary duty, misappropriation, and unjust enrichment). 
 208. Hamblett, Parties Campaign Aggressively, supra note 165. 
 209. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 
2005) (Case Mgmt. Order No. 2) (approving Napoli as Co-Liaison counsel). 
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claims, then a procedure that solicits and defers to the opinions of judges and 
outsiders is paternalistic.  In short, if contract procedure frustrates social 
perceptions, a defender might respond, so what?  Parties contract to deviate 
from the individual lawsuit baseline all the time,210 and when they do, the 
quality of consent is the relevant concern.  Contractual, not procedural, 
legitimacy determines whether any particular deviation should rightly 
flourish.211 
At least for the informal aggregation model, however, I doubt that 
informed and freely given consent is ever possible.  Without the class-wide 
preclusion that Rule 23 promises, defendants obtain global peace or its 
approximate from an aggregate settlement offer only if the supermajority of 
plaintiffs consent to it.  Leveraging plaintiffs’ lawyers’ incentives makes this 
supermajority of consent plausible.  If the defendant requires ninety percent of 
plaintiffs to buy-in before funding the settlement, plaintiffs’ attorneys will do 
everything they can to convince all of their clients to agree to its terms.  The 
plaintiffs in the WTC litigation felt just this pressure.212  The conflict of 
interest between the lawyer and the client she advises, and thus reason to 
question the quality of client consent, is obvious.213 
The ALI’s Principles include a proposal designed to enable global peace 
without the coercion that all-or-nothing settlements, as presently devised, 
create.214  Before receiving a settlement offer, plaintiffs can agree that, once 
the deal is on the table, they will be bound by a “substantial-majority vote” of 
all plaintiffs.215  A deal that wins this vote binds all who sign up for this 
process.216  In other words, a plaintiff who has agreed to the voting mechanism 
might otherwise hold out once the lawyers announce the deal’s terms, but she 
is obliged to settle her claim.  Defending a version of this proposal, Richard 
Nagareda maintained that the real problem with the typical all-or-nothing 
settlement is its timing.217  Lawyers have to advise their clients under the 
shadow of potentially huge fees that will be paid only if close to all plaintiffs 
 
 210. See Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 
32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 769 (1997) (discussing how parties may waive a number of 
procedural protections, such as the right to notice, hearings, or trial). 
 211. For an argument somewhat akin to this summary, see Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation, 
supra note 147, at 1160–64. 
 212. Hamblett, Parties Campaign Aggressively, supra note 165 (discussing the 
“unprecedented effort” by plaintiffs’ attorneys to persuade their clients to accept the settlement 
offer). 
 213. Erichson, Trouble, supra note 148, at 1008–09, 1018. 
 214. ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 153, § 3.17(b). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation, supra note 147, at 1161–62. 
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consent.218  By decoupling the moment when plaintiffs agree to tie their fates 
together from the moment when fees might or might not be paid, presumably 
the temptation to pressure clients diminishes. 
To my mind, a change to the timing does little to reduce the coercive 
potential for either of the decisions plaintiffs have to make.219  The first comes 
before the proposed settlement, when the plaintiffs’ lawyer asks her clients to 
consent to the voting mechanism.  The lawyer has a strong incentive to 
pressure all of her clients to say yes, even without money on the table.  If the 
lawyer succeeds, she can offer a defendant a straightforward path to global 
peace and thereby make settlement more attractive.  The probability of large 
fees from an aggregate deal goes up as the number of clients agreeing to abide 
by a substantial majority vote increases. 
The second moment comes at the time plaintiffs must vote, when the 
settlement and attorneys’ fees hang in the balance.  The lawyers will pressure 
all of their clients to vote for the deal, to ensure that a small minority does not 
derail it.  The moment has particularly extreme coercive potential, because 
pressure comes not just from the lawyer but from other plaintiffs as well.  A 
wavering plaintiff might not like the proposed deal but agonize over the 
thought that her vote against it means that no one will be paid.  As one WTC 
plaintiff remarked when deciding whether to agree to the second settlement 
proposal, “[i]t weighs heavy on one’s mind that your decision would impact 
the compensation of those who are sick . . . because if you don’t get 95 percent 
you’re not going to settle.”220  A mechanism that explicitly lashes the fates of 
all together might engender group solidarity and other communitarian goods to 
flourish,221 but the mechanism also contains within it troubling potential for 
unacceptable peer pressure. 
The ALI’s proposal may improve upon the current, inherently coercive 
structure of all-or-nothing deals, although I doubt that the change in timing is 
all that ameliorative.  But if it is, the tradeoff is that clients must make 
uninformed decisions to abide by the vote of the substantial majority.  
Presumably a plaintiff would want some rough estimate of her claim’s 
strength, particularly compared to her peers’, before agreeing to abide by the 
substantial majority’s will.  An unusually strong claim might make a plaintiff 
reluctant to surrender the final say over her right to sue to a larger group of 
 
 218. Id. at 1161 (“Properly understood, the real point of hesitation about the Vioxx deal lies 
not in its reliance upon client consent but in the timing for such consent—when billions of dollars 
were on table for both lawyers and clients—so as to accentuate both lawyer temptation and client 
concern about regret if the client were to decline the deal.”). 
 219. I here elaborate on what Howard Erichson and Benjamin Zipursky have previously 
argued.  Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 146, at 301–03. 
 220. Navarro, Tough Decisions, supra note 187 (quoting plaintiff Lisa McDonald). 
 221. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Group Consensus, Individual Consent, 79 GEO. WASH. 
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weaker claimants.  If asked to consent to the voting mechanism any period of 
time substantially before settlement, however, the plaintiff cannot receive an 
informed estimate about claim strength.  According to the doctrinaire account 
of mass tort litigation, settlements become likely once plaintiffs establish 
credible threats that they can win at trial.222  This credible threat requires that 
certain contested legal and factual issues get resolved so that parties can make 
rigorous assessments of expected liability.223  Logically, then, clients who have 
to consent to the voting mechanism well in advance of settlement do so when 
these contested issues remain highly uncertain.  For two years, for example, the 
city pursued a dizzying array of immunity defenses that, if they prevailed, 
would have knocked out all of its WTC liability.224  A guess as to claim value 
during this time would necessarily need to factor in immunities, but no one—
not even Judge Hellerstein—could say with any certainty how these defenses 
might play out.225 
* * * 
I realize that the informal aggregation model does not represent contract 
procedure more generally, and so the dysfunctions that make informed, freely 
given consent implausible for aggregated plaintiffs may not exist everywhere.  
Other contexts, however, exacerbate the legitimacy problem.  Important to 
daily life are forms of contract procedure that surface most regularly in 
consumer transactions, like arbitration agreements and forum selection 
clauses.226  For them, consent is most often “fictive” at best,227 so contractual 
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(discussing each of the state and federal immunity defenses asserted by the defendants).  The city 
filed its motion for judgment on the pleadings in February 2006, and the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit issued its opinion on the defenses in March 2008.  See id. at 170; In re World 
Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 225. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 575 (concluding that 
information to determine whether certain immunity defenses applied was lacking without “much, 
much more” discovery). 
 226. See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer 
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 
41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 886 (2008) (documenting how frequently arbitration agreements 
appear in consumer contracts as compared to non-consumer contracts); Walter W. Heiser, Forum 
Selection Clauses in State Courts: Limitations on Enforcement After Stewart and Carnival Cruise, 
45 FLA. L. REV. 361, 361 (1993) (“Forum selection clauses are increasingly common in interstate 
commercial and consumer contracts.”); see also ZACHARY GIMA, TAYLOR LINCOLN & DAVID 
ARKUSH, PUBLIC CITIZEN, FORCED ARBITRATION: UNFAIR AND EVERYWHERE 1 (2009), 
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/UnfairAndEverywhere.pdf (documenting the 
ubiquity of arbitration clauses in consumer form contracts). 
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legitimacy, or at least a type that requires litigants to agree to process, is 
unavailable.  The informal aggregation model falls on the relatively transparent 
end of the contract procedure spectrum, since litigation at least remains in 
courts.  Arbitration agreements lie on the opaque end.  Social perceptions of 
procedural efficacy are not merely occluded but blocked entirely, increasing 
the likelihood that unfair, inaccurate, inefficient, and democratically 
inappropriate processes can stabilize. 
CONCLUSION 
One of Professor Resnik’s great talents is to see connections among events 
and developments that elude the rest of us.  The title of the part of the 
Childress Lecture Panel for which I wrote this Comment—“Wal-Mart, 
A.T.&T., Aggregate Settlements, and the 2009 ALI Principles”—reflects her 
challenge to proceduralists, that we all appreciate the important links among 
the many parts of the American procedural system.  It is important to do so at 
this particular moment, as procedure’s movement into contractual shadows on 
a number of different fronts begs fundamental questions about civil processes 
and the roles they do and should play in a democratic society.  This Comment 
is a tentative stab at putting some of the pieces of the puzzle together, but is 
really just an attempt to follow Professor Resnik’s lead. 
  
 
 227. Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 10, at 129–30; cf. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. 
Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593 (1991) (acknowledging that expecting actual consent to a forum 
selection clause in a consumer form contract “would be entirely unreasonable”). 
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